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STATE MARITAL PROPERTY LAWS
AND FEDERALLY CREATED BENEFITS:
A CONFLICT OF LAWS ANALYSIS
LOUISE GRAHAMt

The laws of individual states have historically controlled familial
relationships and the rights and responsibilities derived from them.
The injection of federal rights into the domestic relations area has
generally been confined to resolution of claims that the application of
particular state laws violated either due process or equal protection
rights of particular persons. l In a limited number of cases concerning
marital property, however, one party has relied upon a federal law
creating a benefit or right that conflicts with the state-created rule apportioning marital property or establishing a support obligation. Such
a conflict of laws problem arose in McCarty v. McCarty. 2 Richard and
Patricia McCarty married in 1957 while Richard was a second year
medical student. 8 During Richard's fourth year in medical school, he
began active military service. For the nineteen years of the McCartys'
marriage, Richard remained in the military, attaining the rank of
colonel and serving approximately eighteen of the twenty years needed
for retirement pay 'eligibility. ~

t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A., University of
Texas, 1965; J.D., University of Texas, 1977.-ED.
1. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 454 U.S.961 (1982) (upholding equal protection challenge to state statute oflimitations on paternity action); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (upholding unwed father's equal protection challenge to
state adoption law); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (upholding due process
challenge to Wisconsin statute barring remarriage by persons delinquent in child suppon payments); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (upholding due
process challenge to city ordinance prohibiting extended family from residing
together); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (upholding equal protection
challenge to discrimination against illegitimate children).
2. McCany v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
3. [d. at 216.
4. [d. Military personnel may retire based on length of service. A regular
commissioned Army officer who has served at least twenty years, with at least ten years
of active service as a commissioned officer, may be retired by the Secretary of the
1
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For the McCartys, as for many other married couples, Richard's
retirement benefits were a major portion of the assets accumulated
during the marriage. 5 Not surprisingly, when the McCartys divorced
in 1976, those benefits became a major feature of the property contest.
Under the laws of the California divorce forum,6 the benefits were
community property subject to division upon divorce. 1 Richard
Army if the officer so requests. 10 U.S.C. § 3911 (1976). Accordingly, Richard McCarty was entitled to the monthly base pay of his retired grade multiplied by 2 ~ % of
the service years credited to him. In any case he could not have received more than
seventy-five percent of the pay upon which the compensation was based.
5. The only other assets accumulated by the McCartys were cash, two
automobiles, the cash value of life insurance policies, and an uncollected debt. 453
U.S. at 218.
6. Although the McCartys had lived in Pennsylvania, Hawaii, the District of
Columbia, Texas, and California, the California divorce court applied forum community property law to the divorce. The court divided the pension, without regard to
other state rules, based upon a general, non-statutory rule that a divorce forum always
applies its own law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 285 (1971); A. VON
MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAWS OF MULTI-STATE PROBLEMS 84-90 (1965). Most
divorce courts have ignored the problems arising when the forum recognizes community or marital property but the asset to be divided was acquired in part in a state
or states that did not recognize the community concept at the time the parties resided
there. Compare Cameron v. Cameron, 9 FAM. L. REP. 2001 (1982) (pension divisible
though not earned in community property state) with Stephens v. Stephens, 93 N.M.
1, 595 P.2d 1196 (1979) (whether a pension is marital property depends upon the law
of the state in which the benefits were acquired).
7. California statutorily defines community property as property acquired by
either spouse during the marriage "when not acquired as the separate property of
either." CAL. CIV. CODE § 687 (West 1982). Separate property is statutorily defined for
both spouses as all property owned before marriage; property acquired after marriage
by gift, bequest, devise or descent; and property that is the rent, issue, or profit from
other separate property. Id. §§ 5107, 5108 (West 1970). Earnings of a spouse living
separate and apart from the other spouse are also separate property. Id. § 5118 (West
Supp. 1982). Living separate and apart requires an intention to separate that
demonstrates a complete and final breakdown of the marital relationship. See In re
Marriage of Baragry, 73 Cal. App. 3d 444, 140 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1977). Additionally,
earnings following a legal separation are separate property. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5119
(West Supp. 1982). Under California law, the respective interests of both spouses in
community property are considered present, equal, and existing interests. Id. § 5105.
California also recognizes as divisible quasi-community property all property that
would have been treated as community property of the spouse who acquired the property had the spouse been a California domiciliary at the time of acquisition. Id. §
4803. Upon divorce, a California trial court must divide community and quasicommunity property equally. Id. § 4800. Between the time of the McCartys' 1957 marriage and their 1976 divorce they had been stationed in four different states and the
District of Columbia. Only California and Texas were community property states. W.
DE FuNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 1 (2d ed. 1971).
Nevertheless, Hawaii would have permitted the equitable division of all property owned
by either party in any divorce rendered after 1955. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 510-9 (1976).
Similarly, though the District of Columbia did not recognize marital property, it permitted the just apportionment of all property. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910 (1981). Pen-
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McCarty claimed, however, that federal laws creating the military retirement benefits preempted the application of California's community property laws and required that the assets be set aside to him as his
separate, indivisible property. 8 The Supreme Court agreed with his
contentions. In McCarty, the Court held that the federal law creating
military retirement benefits required those benefits to remain the personal entitlement of individual II?-ilitary personnel; the statute mandated that military retirement benefits be classified as the separate
property of the military spouse upon divorce.
. Before the Court's decision in McCarty, it had faced only a half
dozen cases in which federal law allegedly conflicted with state marital
property law. 9 All but one of the pre-McCarty decisions were rendered
prior to acceptance of the notion that marriage is an economic partnership and that property acquired during the marriage by either
spouse should be available for equitable distribution upon divorce. 1o
The adoption by many states of some form of marital propertyll and
the concurrent proliferation of federally connected benefits 12 carries
the potential for tension between state and federal policies in this area.
The passage by a state legislature of a divorce act espousing the idea of
marital property or equitable distribution is a strong statement of any
state's social policy toward the marital institution and its dissolution.
Therefore, important state policies in areas traditionally left to state
regulations have been affected by the result in McCarty.
nsylvania, however, did not recognize the marital property concept until 1980. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(e) (Purdon Supp. 1982·83). Therefore, because Penn·
sylvania had no equitable division rule it was the only state in which division of retire·
ment benefits would not have been possible under state law.
8. 453 U.S. at 218. California had consistently treated military retirement
benefits as community property subject to division on divorce. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Milhan, 27 Cal. 3d 765, 613 P.2d 812, 166 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1980); In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592,517 P.2d 449,111 Cal. Rptr. 369, cert. denz·ed, 419
U.S. 825 (1974): In re Marriage of Davis, 113 Cal. App. 3d 485, 169 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1980); Emmett v. Emmett, 109 Cal. App. 3d 753, 169 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1979); Gorman
v. Gorman, 90 Cal. App. 3d 454, 153 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1979). But see Goldberg, Is
Armed Services Retired Pay Really Community Property? 48 CAL. ST. B.]. 12 (1973).
9. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); United States v. Yaze1I,
382 U.S. 341 (1966); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964); Free v. Bland, 369
U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S.
382 (1905); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904).
10. Only Hisquierdo was decided after the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1970. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. 3 (1973).
11. See infra note 291.
12. A 1978 General Accounting Office Report listed more than two dozen
federal retirement systems. See 2 U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, NEED FOR OVERALL
POLICY AND COORDINATED MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL RETIREMENT SYSTEMS XXIXXIV (Dec. 29, 1978). See also Rombauer, Marital Status and Eligibilityfor Federal
Statutory Income Benefi"ts: A Historical Survey, 52 WASH. L. REv. 227 (1977).
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Recent congressional action has mitigated the harsh result McCarty
inflicted upon former spouses of military personnel. 13 An amendment

13. In addition to McCarty's importance in the conflicts area, the case had
substantial impact upon individual spouses of military personnel. Before McCarty, a
number of states had permitted division of the military retirement benefits. See, e.g.,
Czarnecki v. Czarnecki, 123 Ariz. 466, 600 P.2d 1098 (1979); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96
Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975); In re Marriage of Musser, 70 m. App. 2d 706, 388
N.E.2d 1289 (1979); In re Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1980); Chisnell
v. Chisnell, 82 Mich. App. 699, 267 N.W.2d 155 (1978); Daffm v. Daffin, 567 S.W.2d
672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); In re Marriage of Miller, 609 P.2d 1185 (Mont. 1980),
vacated, 453 U.S. 917 (1981); Kruger v. Kruger, 139 N.J. Super. 413,354 A.2d 340,
modif£ed, 73 N.]. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977); LeClert v. LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, 453
P.2d 755 (1969); Mona v. Mona, 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Payne v.
Payne, 82 Wash. 2d 573,512 P.2d 736 (1973). The leading decision refusing to divide
military retirement benefits was In re Marriage of Ellis, 538 P .2d 1347 (Colo. Ct. App.
1975). The Ellis court refused to divide military retirement benefits on the theory that
such benefits were not property as a matter of state law. See Paulsen v. Paulsen, 269
Ark. 523, 601 S.W.2d 873 (1980); Hiscox v. Hiscox, 385 N.E.2d 1166 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979); Hill v. Hill, 47 Md. App. 460, 424 A.2d 770 (1981); Baker v. Baker, 120 N.H.
645, 421 A.2d 998 (1980); Baker v. Baker, 546 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1975). After Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), several states anticipated the McCarty
rule. See Cose v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 1979); Russell v. Russell, 605 S.W.2d 33
(Ky. Ct. App. 1980); DeDon v. DeDon, 390 So. 2d 937 (La. Ct. App. 1980). For a complete discussion of Hisqu£erdo see £nfra text accompanying notes 172-221.
From the point of view of former spouses, nondivisibility was an especially serious
matter for two reasons. First, retirement benefits were likely to be the most important
asset accumulated during the marriage. Second, the transient nature of military service dictated that spouses of military personnel had little opportunity to establish work
records permitting them to acquire comparable, individual benefits in the private sector. See Hearings on H.R. 2817, H.R. 3677, and H.R. 6270: Legislation Related to
Benefits for Former Spouse of Military Re#ree Before the Military Compensation Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Seruices, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1980) (state
ment of Winifred Cowan). One survey conducted by an organization of former
military spouses revealed that the average age of the wife at divorce was 44; the
average length of the marriage was 22 ~ years; the average number of moves made by
the former spouses was 12. Id. at 75. See also Pension Problems of Older Women:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Retirement Income and Employment of the Select
House Comm. on Aging, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975); Women £n Midlife-Security
and Fulfillment, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Select House Comm. on
Agtng and the Subcomm. on Retirement Income and Employment, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1978).
Since McCarty, the Court has extended its reach beyond the area of marital property division and has affected state court child support orders. In Ridgway v. Ridgway,
454 U.S. 46 (1981), the Court held that a beneficiary designation under a Serviceman's
Group Life Insurance policy overrides a state court order requiring the policy holder
to maintain that policy for the benefit of his minor children. Although the issue in
Ridgway was technically not one of the marital property status of insurance benefits,
the case involved a similar conflict between state domestic relations law and federal
law creating a benefit for service personnel.
Richard Ridgway was divorced by a Maine court in 1977. The state court order,
enforcing a settlement agreement between the parties, required Ridgway to maintain
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to a defense department appr.opriations bill provides for some division
of military retirement pay upon divorce. 14 The amendment also pro·
vides former spouses with the right to enforce property division awards
through garnishment of military retirement pay in some instances. IS
An analysis of McCarty and its predecessors remains important,
however, because it provides insight into the Court's methodology for
the resolution of asserted conflicts between state and federal law.
In McCarty, the Court characterized the issue as one of federal
preemption of state marital property law. IS Outside of the domestic
relations area, federal preemption is a familiar topic. 17 The area of
domestic relations, however, is one generally conceded to fall within
the purview of the states. IS For that reason, tests that consider whether
the federal government has intended to occupy the field are inappropriate. I9 When the Court deals with the question of preemption of
state law by federal statutes, the problem before it is one of choice of
law. A case concerning federal preemption thus is essentially a conflicts case although the choice of law must be made vertically rather
than horizontally.
The McCarty majority adopted an interest analysis method for resolving the choice of law question raised in that case. In so doing, however, the Court demonstrated a number of problems for which theories of governmental interest analysis have been criticized. This article
will focus upon the problems raised by McCarty as a conflicts case.
The first section of the article briefly discusses the application of interest analysis to vertical choice of law problems. 20 The second section
traces the Court's prior cases and establishes the Court's use of interest
analysis methodology. 21 Part three discusses recent preemption cases
and explains some of the problems raised by the Court's interest analy-

his Serviceman's Group Life Insurance for the benefit of his minor children. Mter the
divorce, however, Ridgway remarried and named his second wife as the beneficiary of
the policy. Mter his death, a Maine appellate court imposed a constructive trust on
the proceeds for the minor children's benefit. The Supreme Court ruled that federal
law prohibited the imposition of the trust and required that the proceeds be paid to his
second wife, the designated beneficiary. [d. at 60.
14. See t"nfra text accompanying notes 249-305.
15. [d.
16. 453 U.S. at 211.
17. The most familiar cases have arisen under conflicts between the commerce
clause and state legislation. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 343 (10th ed. 1980); Hart, The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954).
18. 453 U.S. at 220.
19. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
20. See t"nfra text accompanying notes 24-50.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 51-171.
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sis methods. 22 Parts four and five discuss particular problems raised by
both the Court's preemption analysis and the legislation overruling
McCarty's result. 23
I.

THE ApPLICATION OF INTEREST ANALYSIS TO VERTICAL
CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEMS

The preemption test adopted by the Supreme Court in McCarty
requires that the conflict between the state and federal regulation be
more than a "mere conflict in words. "24 Instead, the application of
state marital property law to federally created benefits must threaten
harm to "clear and substantial" federal interests. 25 In both the language and the structure of its opinion, the McCarty Court revealed its
governmental interest analysis methodology. The Court identified the
relevant federal interests and devoted a significant portion of its opinion to explaining those interests that it viewed as important. The concentration on policy, however, is not the only key to understanding the
federal benefit/state marital property law clash as a choice of law
problem to be resolved by interest analysis. Policy dicussions are not
limited to conflicts cases. McCarty and the cases preceeding it can be
denominated conflicts cases by virtue of the requirement that the
Court choose between the laws of two different sovereigns. That the
cases exhibit the use of governmental interest analysis is demonstrated
by the Court's application of the federal forum's policy in cases in
which there is some apparent federal interest without regard to the
content of the state marital property law that posed the alternative
choice. 26 This normal tendency of an interest analysis forum to apply
22. See infra text accompanying notes 172-248.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 249-331.
24. 453 U.S. at 232.
25. Id. at 60. In its more recent opinion in Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46
(1981), the Court recited the major damage to clear and substantial federal interests
test but it also emphasized the "pervasive and detailed characteristics" of the congressional scheme for regulation. Id. at 53. The Court's emphasis upon detail should not
detract from the McCarty test requiring a clear conflict before the supremacy clause
begins to operate. A focus upon the detail with which Congress has undertaken regulations overemphasizes the federal interests without a careful examination of whether a
true conflict exists. See infra text accompanying note 34.
26. McCarty demonstrates the use of interest analysis by the Coun not only
because the Court framed its language in terms of the interests of the federal government but because the Coun looked to the policy underlying the federal rules it conceived to be relevant. The hallmark of interest analysis is that it is a system under
which no rule can be applied without examining the rule's content. See B. CURRIE,
SELECTED EsSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 6 (1963). The Coun's methodology in
McCarty demonstrates that when federal regulations conflict with state marital property law, the issues cannot be resolved by asking general questions such as whether
Congress has occupied the field. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Rice v.
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its own law is supported by the presence of the supremacy clause, 27
which permits no balancing of the state and federal interests in contemplation.
Although governmental interest analysis is a system generally used
to choose between the laws of sister states, it has also been applied to
vertical choice of law problems. 28 Governmental interest analysis posits
that every rule of law is predicated upon a legislative policy. 29 That
policy expresses the governing sovereign's interest in the resolution of
any particular dispute. 3o The basic questions asked in interest analysis
seek to determine what the legislative body creating a rule of law intended when they drafted the rule. 31 Under interest analysis, when the
laws of two sovereigns are potentially available to resolve a problem,
each law must be examined in order to determine whether the policy
underlying its enactment will be furthered by its application to the situation at hand. 32 A decision, therefore, that a legislature did not intend that its rule apply in a given situation is simply another way to exSanta Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941). Instead, interest analysis requires that specific policies underlying the federal
rule in question be identified and evaluated. 453 U.S. at 227-32. See infra text accompanying notes 172-248. This article criticizes the Court for attempting to strengthen its
rule of decision through reference to policies that are not necessarily connected to the
conflicts question to be resolved and for failing to carefully analyze some policies suggested to support the decisions.
27. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2., cl. 2.
28. Leathers, Erie and Its ProgencyAs Choice of Law Cases, 11 Hous. L. REv.
791 (1974). Professor Leathers' use of governmental interest analysis to reconcile the
cases from Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965), demonstrates that in diversity actions conflicts between the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and state rules can be resolved consistently only by examination of both federal and state interests in the application of each sovereign's rule. His
article is especially helpful because it carefully explains the need for considering the
particular policies embodied in any rule. His thesis, that the presence of a federal rule
is not sufficient to bar application of state law unless the federal rule expresses a valid
interest of the federal forum, has been accepted by the Court. See Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
29. See Leathers, supra note 28, at 793. See also B. CURRIE, supra note 26, at

6.
30. B. CURRIE, supra note 26, at 6.
3!. Professor Currie recognized that the task facing a court was one of construction and interpretation. See id. at 184, 627. Since its inception, governmental interest analysis has been criticized as a method allowing courts to conjure up legislative
intent and policy to suit the result preferred in a particular case. Reese, Choice of
Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315 (1972). For a recent, wellarticulated example of such criticism see Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of
Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REv. 392 (1980). It is beyond the scope of this article
to evaluate various choice of law methods. For such evaluations, see D. CAVERS, THE
CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS (1965); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS (2d ed. 1980).
32. Leathers, supra note 28, at 793.

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

7 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

8 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

9 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

10 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

11 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

12 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

13 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

14 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

15 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

16 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

17 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

18 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

19 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

20 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

21 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

22 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

23 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

24 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

25 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

26 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

27 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

28 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

29 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

30 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

31 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

32 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

33 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

34 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

35 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

36 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

37 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

38 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

39 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

40 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

41 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

42 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

43 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

44 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

45 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

46 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

47 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

48 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

49 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

50 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

51 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

52 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

53 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

54 1982-1983

HeinOnline -- 29 Wayne L. Rev.

55 1982-1983

